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Orthodoxy and Economy :
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L'auteur entreprend un « dialogue » avec le professeur allemand Alfred Müller-Armack sur la base de l'étude de ce dernier Zur Religionssoziologie de europäischen Ostens. Alfred Müller est le premier à avoir essayé de soumettre l'Eglise Orthodoxe européenne au contrôle de l'expérience acquise par la sociologie de la religion au cours des recherches effectuées au sujet de congrégations occidentales.

Le présent dialogue se limite au problème des relations entre Orthodoxie et économie, et spécialement dans le territoire hellénique durant la période byzantine et post-byzantine.

La présente analyse confirme l'idée fondamentale d'A. Müller selon laquelle dans la vie byzantine, le dogme et en général les pouvoirs qui découlent « des grands systèmes métaphysiques » influencent d'une façon décisive les processus sociaux et avec eux, la formation de différents « styles économiques ». Cependant, l'étude des problèmes particuliers montre que certaines idées de Müller sont très générales et ont comme point de départ l'image de l'Orthodoxie répandue en Occident. Cette image se révèle incomplète et même parfois erronée lorsqu'elle est confrontée avec les données objectives. L'Auteur montre le caractère incomplet de l'opinion généralement admise (et en particulier par Müller) selon laquelle l'Orthodoxie, tournée avec insistance vers les valeurs métaphysiques, se révélerait non seulement indifférente au déroulement des affaires terrestres mais cultiverait parmi les fidèles une mentalité ne favorisant pas la production économique. Malgré l'existence d'une telle tendance, il y a beaucoup de données confirmant une attitude beaucoup plus positive des orthodoxes envers les réalités terrestres.

Introductory Remarks

"The world of the European East helps us understand an opposition which is difficult to define." The German economist and sociologist Professor Alfred Müller-Armack (subsequently referred to as MA) makes this remark in the beginning of his treatise *The Sociology of*

Religion in Eastern Europe.¹ The purpose of his treatise is to overcome the difficulties preventing an understanding of the Eastern Orthodox Church and to present the influences which its spiritual tradition exerted on the cultural, political and economic life of its people.

As far as we know, up to now this treatise has not been used by the Orthodox world. In fact, it seems to be almost unknown although its importance has been stated in a very formal way.²

The sociological aspects of MA's treatise could very well have provided the Orthodox world with a starting point for a new identity, at least with regard to a presentation of its pressing problems although no less for stressing the specific nature of Orthodoxy. For this reason, even though it may be somewhat late, it may not be untimely to attempt a discussion with the distinguished German scholar who honoured Orthodoxy with his erudite observations. We stress the aim of clarification in our discussion, because nothing more is desired nor possible in the present analysis.

The object, extent and method of our dialogue are more or less determined by MA's treatise.

MA defines the object of his research as an investigation by sociological analysis, of the depth and breath to which the "spiritual tradition" of the Eastern Church influenced the social life of its people (333).

Without stating it clearly, the study focused on the subject of "Religion and Economy," which is also the object of our present paper. Our purpose involves examining all of MA's works

¹ "Zur Religionssoziologie des europäischen Ostens," in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 61 (1945). This work has been republished along with other works by the same author in a volume entitled *Religion und Wirtschaft. Geistesgeschichtliche Hintergründe unserer europäischen Lebensform*, Stuttgart, 1959. We refer to the volume just mentioned, noting the page numbers in parentheses.

² Thus Professor Panagiotis BRATSIOTIS in a work entitled "The Sociological Theory of Max Weber and the Orthodox East" (in Greek), in the *Annual (Epeteris) of the Society for Byzantine Studies*, Vol. 23 (1953), pp. 358-370, published a broad summary of MA's work (*Religion und Wirtschaft*) before the Academy of Athens (*Minutes of the Academy of Athens*, Vol. 36 (1961), pp. 103-106). Professor Bratsiotis justly emphasizes the usefulness of MA's research, for he was the first to examine Orthodoxy in the Sociology of Religion. But although MA's research can be seen a continuation of Max Weber's efforts, since Weber did not treat Orthodoxy; we do not agree with Prof. Bratsiotis' opinion that MA belongs to the school of Max Weber and that he is simply continuing "his theory." In his study *Die Bedeutung der Religionssoziologie in der Gegenwart*, which is of an introductory and programmatic nature, MA clearly distinguishes his own position from that of M. Weber. In fact, he says that Weber wants to approach the phenomenon of religion with doubt and that Weber even cultivated a "Sociology of Religion without religion" (*Es ist eine Religionssoziologie ohne Religion, ja im bestimmten Sinne sogar ohne einen festen Begriff des Religiösen* (4)). Therefore, MA rightly expresses the opinion that progress in the Sociology of Religion presupposes its liberation from the patronage of Max Weber's scientific ideal.

A brief criticism of MA's work has also been published by Demosthenes Savrames (*Ostkirchliche Studien* 9 (1960), pp. 51-56), who points out some of its weaknesses.

Of course, neither P. Bratsiotis nor D. Savrames attempt a systematic confrontation of the very serious and, in many ways, very timely problems posed by MA which, even now, remain unanswered.

dealing with Orthodoxy in general but only inasmuch as they are related to our problem.

It seems superfluous to mention the difficulty of our present undertaking. To our knowledge, it is the first specific sociological investigation of the question of "Orthodoxy and Economy" taken from an Orthodox viewpoint. Emphasizing these difficulties, MA mentioned the fact that Max Weber, for example, failed to consider the entire area of the Eastern Church. There are sporadic remarks in his theological, sociological and politico-economic bibliography, but no real systematic approach to the problem (351). The subject before us is so vast, multi-faceted and difficult that, even if it were possible to exhaust the bibliography which has subsequently grown, we would have to characterize the present analysis as simple prolegomena to the problem of "Orthodoxy and Economy." Also we have to restrict the scope of our study. Leaving entirely out of consideration the differentiations which occurred throughout the centuries, MA proceeds from the fact that the total area of the Eastern Orthodox Church can be brought under the heading of a uniform "economic style" (*Wirtschaftsstil*). Under this conviction he examines this area with common socio-economic ideas and structures, and compares it with the societies formed under the influence of Roman Catholicism and the confessions of the Reformation. At this point, two questions arise, namely,

- a) the relationship of the Byzantine and the East European Orthodox world with the rest of Europe, and
- b) the cultural differentiation of the originally common basis of the Orthodox area.

These questions, difficult and complex in themselves, have always existed and are presently laden with the different viewpoints of the various creeds and ideologies concerning them. This is why it has not yet been possible to find answers which could be considered the results of unbiased scientific investigation. Those who are "Helleno-centred" will answer the questions one way; the "Dytikoplektoi" (those who are strongly influenced by the West), the "Slavophiles" the "Latinofrones" (Latin-minded), and the friends and enemies of Orthodoxy will answer another way.

MA's viewpoint claims to be free from the subjectivism of many Western writers. It can be boiled down to the following statements, as opposed to the evidently heterogeneous East-Asiatic societies and cultures, which MA labels *Orient*, Europe is presented as a unit; the writer calls it, by way of distinction, *Okzident* (17 ff.). Europe, however, is made up of a variety of cultures. The confessional differences which eventually gave it its form, namely, the Helleno-centred Eastern and the Latin-centred Western Christianity, MA calls the *Osten* and *Westen* of Europe (24 ff.). Usually, MA takes the terms *Okzident* and *Abendland* as synonyms. As regards religion, both terms include the whole cultural area covered by the other two terms of "Eastern" and "Western" Rome (*Ostrom - Westrom*). Within this conception, MA also uses the terms *Okzident* and *Europe* as synonyms to include the entire cultural inheritance of the Graeco-Roman world as it had survived

up to and was re-formed by the Christian era (18). Thus, MA seems to reject the views of those who are fanatically Latin-minded placing the eastern boundaries of "Europe" between Vienna and Warsaw,³ as well as those of the equally fanatic Slavophiles and certain Hellenominded people who consider the world of Western Rome as an estrangement from and a falsification of original European Christianity.⁴

It is not possible to discuss these problems here. While we have some general reservations about MA's geographical, historical and cultural boundaries, we basically agree with his statement that the term *Okcident*, as opposed to the term *Orient*, actually covers the areas of the Old and the New Rome. This *Okcident* which, in MA's terminology was originally more or less one culturally, constituted the first "ring of development" in Europe (16), and underwent a cultural differentiation which became manifest in the schism between the "Papal" and the "Byzantine" churches. Consequently, as previously mentioned, two cultural zones came into existence, each of which progressively formed its own identity. We have already mentioned that MA accepts Orthodoxy as a *cultural unit*. In addition, he places Byzantine Orthodoxy among the great spiritual forces which have left their indelible seals on the face of the earth and considers the area moulded by Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe as basically unchanged in its cultural aspect. On this percept is based the characteristic "position" of MA's entire sociological work, according to which the influence of the spiritual forces on the formation and development of the various cultures (330) must be placed near, or above, the "natural factors." Furthermore, he stresses the fact that the West never knew a unifying cultural force of such formative strength as the "legacy of Byzantium" was for the East. Compared with that of Constantinople, the influence of Rome on the western and central parts of Europe has been manifestly weaker, he continues. The Helleno-Christian spirit remained undisputedly the life-giving source of Eastern Europe for more than a millenium up to the present day, and the "Greek Orthodox Church grew, in a very special sense, into the spiritual unity of which the West was deprived" (330). As mentioned before, MA, using this concept as a base, examines Orthodoxy as a uniform cultural body, sometimes generalizing if required by special situations, in order to reveal the true nature of the phenomenon. It is not possible to thoroughly examine MA's concept here, although it is widely discussed in our day from many reasons, especially the current inter-Orthodox dialogue about the position that must be given to the Helleno-Byzantine heritage in the life of the Orthodoxy today and in the future. In any case, we believe that it is difficult to ignore the facts which led Arnold J. Toynbee to accept two cultural entities: the "Greek Orthodox

³ As a characteristic example of this tendency we mention here the outstanding work of the Polish historian, Feliks KNECZNY, *On the Purity of Civilisations*, London, 1963, pp. 27-32, 269.

⁴ Of the many authors representing this tendency, we mention the Serbian theologian Justin Popovic and some of the monks of Mt. Athos whose works reflect the most austere contemporary Orthodox criticism of the West.

Christian Civilization main body" with Byzantium as its point of origin and its centre, and the "Greek Orthodox Civilization in Russia."⁵

This distinction reveals the common base, that is to say, the formative power of the Greek Orthodox element, and in no way refutes MA's position, but rather makes possible the necessary consideration and analysis of other elements which, as we believe, justify Toynbee's distinction. For this reason, attempting to enter into dialogue with MA, we place ourselves within the above mentioned "main body" of the Greek Orthodox civilization and refrain as much as possible from generalizing our viewpoint and applying it to the whole of Orthodoxy. We emphasize this restriction in order to stress the fact that our objections to certain views of MA do not necessarily preclude their possible application to situations in other sectors of the Orthodox world. Furthermore, we do not claim to represent an opinion held by Orthodoxy as a whole, except as far as essentials are concerned.

MA confines his investigation to the last three or four centuries, but because he considers the rôle played by Byzantium as very significant for the formation of Orthodoxy as a whole, the present analysis cannot stray from this focal point. However, without this necessary return to origins, there will always be the danger of secondary phenomena becoming autonomous; they can only be properly understood in correlation with the causes that created them.⁶

Methodologically speaking, MA attempts to apply the experience which the Sociology of Religion has gained in investigating Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in central and western Europe to the test of Eastern Europe. In his endeavour, MA tries to fill the gap left by Max Weber (8), but, as we stated before, MA's starting point and perspective are different. He does not want to follow Weber's "historical relativism" (*historischer Relativismus*) (5) nor his physiocratic interpretations of the 19th century nor those of the idealistic 18th century (333). His aim is to prove how profound and widespread the power of the Spirit

⁵ The cultural unity of the Orthodox world is also extolled by the Russian historian Dimitri OBOLENSKY in his recent work *The Byzantine Commonwealth - Eastern Europe, 500 - 1453*, London, 1971. Sontrariwise, another renowned Russian scholar Paul BYDOKIMOV, in his work *L'orthodoxie* (Delachaux et Niestlé, S.A., Neuchâtel, 1965), while in no way disputing Orthodoxy's spiritual unity, underlines the factors of cultural differentiation. Cf. especially the chapter entitled "Byzance après Byzance." (The title is from B. TATAKIS' work *La philosophie byzantine, Histoire de la philosophie*. E. Bréhier, Presses Universitaires de France, 1949). As is known, one decisively important factor was cutting off the Northern countries from Byzantium through military operations; for example, in the ninth century the Magyar invasion of Hungary cut the West Slavs off from Byzantium while the interposition of the Kipchaks and the Seljuk Turks (who were later incorporated into the Mongolian Empire - Tatars or Tartars) cut off communications between Russia and Byzantium, thus cutting the Orthodox world in two with decisive results. Cf. William H. MCNEILL, *The Rise of the West. A History of the Human Community*, The University of Chicago Press, 1963.

⁶ MA does not examine the developments occurring after the greater part of Orthodoxy has been subjugated to the control of the socialist systems, nor even their relation to the social-economic tradition of Orthodoxy, as would have been natural. For this reason and also because of limited space, it is not possible to refer to related problems here.

is during the formation of the Greek Orthodox Civilization. In order for the "trajectory of the Spirit in History" to become manifest and prove "the power of metaphysical systems" and the "chemistry" of spiritual transformations, it is necessary to "carefully and realistically lay a foundation" (333-334). According to the writer, only a "Real-soziologie" can accomplish this task because it alone is in a position to observe the "genetic development of the phenomenon" and satisfy the chief scientific mission of the Sociology of Religion. It examines the material collected in a general investigation and explores its inner relationships to lead us to see the historical units (10). This method of synthesis, implying as it does the characteristics and trends of the Sociology of Culture (*Kultursoziologie*), exposes us to the dangers of generalizing, which we shall prove in the following pages.

If we pursue the course prescribed by MA, we are subject to the same dangers, which perhaps can only be avoided by restricting our subject in the way we have described. We shall not follow MA's classification of the material and his chapter titles. From the plethora of problems broached by him we shall select only those which deal more directly with the topic "Orthodoxy and Economy."

We close the present introductory remarks repeating that our present analysis is only attempting a clearer articulation of certain basic problems which should be approached with the help of sociological research, because they are vitally important for the present and future of Orthodoxy.

A Synopsis of the Contents of Müller-Armack's Treatise

Our study of MA's treatise begins with his conviction that spiritual forces prevailed over "natural factors" in history and played a major rôle in forming "cultural styles" and economic life. This conviction is maintained throughout the whole treatise. The last words of the study are categorical: "Rarely has the power of the Spirit manifested itself more impressively than in the history of Byzantium" (370). For this reason, MA rightfully presents the most characteristic elements of Orthodox religiosity, those which give Orthodoxy its basic identity from which the determining spiritual forces proceed.

While seeking those basic characteristics MA had mainly Russian sources in mind, especially those of pre-war theology.⁷ Due to the Russian form of piety, this theology leaned towards mysticism (in contrast with the rationalism of the West) and also contributed to solidifying the faint image of Orthodoxy which existed at that time. Subsequently, it not only prevailed in the West but also became highly cherished. According to this picture, which MA rather easily accepts as the starting point of his observations, "the Church of Byzantium appears in grandiose metaphysical ecstasy" (344). According to MA, this

⁷ Moreover, the majority of the works mentioned by MA (331) are rather general. It seems that he did not take into account the more recent monographs, especially the later research in Byzantine studies.

picture expresses the fundamental life-style of the whole body of Orthodoxy (329-330) because the "innermost vital force," which formed the Orthodox identity (*Selbstverständnis*) of the other nations of southeastern Europe, originated in Byzantium.

At this point, it might be useful to reconstruct this picture based on MA's treatise in order to single out those points affecting the economic realm. Later, we shall examine some of these points critically with the hope that the confirmation, or possibly the divergent expression of one or another of these views, will advance our sociological knowledge of Orthodoxy.

A dominant characteristic of MA's picture of Orthodoxy is the definite turning toward *metaphysical values* accompanied by a turning away from the "world." This tendency resulting from a powerful eschatological mysticism finds positive expression in a rich liturgical life and negative expression in a reluctance to intentionally intervene in worldly matters. The legacy of the classical age was able to survive one millenium in Byzantium. Byzantine state policy presented many achievements which far surpass what we popularly call "Byzantine" (345). Nonetheless, Byzantium seems to symbolize a civilization which has turned away from the mundane and no longer influences history, especially after the fall of Constantinople in the year 1453 (344-345). However, we can observe a strange phenomenon of unique significance. This Eastern church never intentionally sought power over the various cultural sectors and civil authorities existing in or ruling the state, but although it nevertheless exerted a very strong spiritual influence on the life of its people (345).

The "mystical immediacy of the religious life" is considered to be the basic characteristic of Orthodox spirituality. The Orthodox believer lives in a personal and lively communion with the supernatural world. Within this illumined world of Divine Sovereignty he "lives in Christ," not so much under the aspect of the suffering Christ, as in Western religiosity, but under the most glorious aspect of Christus Pantocrator, the symbol of the victory of Revelation over mundane realities.

MA distinguishes three basic consequences of this life - style of "immediate transcendence."

- 1) The contents of Revelation as defined by the Synods were henceforth experienced by the emotions without the *logos (ratio)* and are thus not subject to intellectual reflexion. This entailed a certain general spiritual inertia with serious effects on cultural life and, more specifically, on business and economics.

- 2) The personal immediacy of religious life did not favor the formation of a *hierarchical sacerdotal system* like that of the Roman Catholic Church with its assuring and authentic rational interpretation of dogma.

- 3) Under the aspect of transcendence, the *mundane becomes* relative. The non-importance of worldly things engenders an *indifference* toward the *arts* (except the "sacred" arts). In this sense, the world does not have soteriological value, even as a lifestyle (general behaviour) of the

individual. This attitude of mind has direct consequences for both the individual manifestations of social life and for social life as a whole (346-348).

These three fundamental lifestyles, MA believes, express the Orthodox identity and form the basis of his study. We shall summarize this study highlighting those points that seem important for our subject of Orthodoxy and Economy.

1) Unlike the Roman Catholic clergy and scholastic theology, the Orthodox Church did not attempt to define dogma in a broad system whose defense would have required an authentic and powerful *hierarchy* and sophisticated subtle *intellects*. Sociologically speaking, this means that the hierarchy did not develop of itself, nor did it acquire the rights and privileges of a definite *class* within society as it did in the West. That is why the Orthodox Church became a *State Church* (*Staatskirche*) and thus did not contribute to a *differentiation of classes* in society, nor lead to the formation of an *aristocracy*, an *urban class* or a system of free *cities* that arose in the West mainly because of tensions between the Church and the State (350). The Church's self-restriction to the "sacred" realm and its obedience to the state granted the latter supreme worth, power and authority which did not favor the development of counterforces such as aristocracy, feudalism, nobility, free cities, etc. All of these factors helped to strengthen the centralized authority of the state and also paved the way to state intervention into practically all areas of society. The lack of counterforces and differentiation of authority prevented the development and best use of the economic potential available.

2) This hermetic spirit of the Church helped avoid tensions such as those between Christianity and idolatry, church and state, faith and intellect, but the prevailing climate did not favour the advancement of a rationalistic science or a *technology* based on scientific thought (351, cf. 356 ff.).

3) Because of this uncompetitive spirit, the Church did not become involved in worldly affairs. Hence, it had no reason to develop a system of *Ethics in Economics* and subjugate economic endeavours to moral norms the way the West did within Scholastic theology, Lutheranism and especially Calvinism (352).

4) Furthermore, since its members were recruited from the monasteries, the higher ranking Orthodox clergy did not compete with the temporal rulers for their *luxury* and manifestations of *power*. As a result, the East never could compare with the West in erecting huge cathedrals or other magnificent buildings, because the most impressive ecclesiastical edifices were due to state initiative. The comparatively small Orthodox churches are lost in the middle of commercial and other buildings (352).

5) Orthodox monasticism gave priority to *anchoritism* and *introversion* and hence did not develop into orders like those in the West which came to represent various political trends with their respective missionary, cultural and educational efforts as well as their economic and even political activities (352 ff.).

6) The absence of religious sects, due mainly to the protection which the state gave the Church, had far-reaching social and economic effects. From the 17th to the 19th centuries, Calvinist sects played a decisive rôle in the organization of social progress and the shaping of social ideas. Whereas the various Western sects pricked the social conscience of both state and hierarchy, the middle and upper classes of the East, lacking such critical instigation, were incredibly insensitive to the wretchedness all around them (353).⁸

7) A complete "theologization" of intellectual and spiritual life prevented the development of tension between the *sacred* and the *profane*, and hindered the transformation of spiritual forces into an autonomous secular culture. This situation created a *cultural void* which the Orthodox people quickly filled by borrowing from the West (community organization, national identity, technical ideas, economic reforms, etc.).

8) The growth of individual consciousness which occurred in the West around the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance was also hindered. The individual formed part of a group and did not develop *personal initiative*. The resulting weakness in business enterprise is so typical in the East, although the overpopulated rural areas should have exerted pressure in this direction.

9) Unlike Western creeds and especially Calvinism, the Eastern Church did not develop a moral code in economics. It did not adopt, for example, the Calvinist doctrine of *predestination* which, according to Max Weber, led to *intercosmic ascetism* and its well-known socio-economic consequences. MA states that, on the contrary, the whole religious system of the East ended with the secular realm and man's behaviour in this world becoming indifferent toward salvation and consequently not tangibly affecting life and/or culture (354-355).

Based on the above statements, MA examines "The economic spirit of the East" in a separate chapter and comes to following conclusions.

10) The East's attitude toward economic concerns should not be considered a failure; it does not result from "not being able to" but rather of "not wanting to" because of its devotion to metaphysical values (362).

11) Economic rationalism and calculation are characteristic of the West; the spiritual world of the East never favoured a comparable development (362).

12) The East, more than any other area of Europe, preserved the cultural aspects of agricultural life.

13) According to MA, this preservation has cultural and economic

⁸ MA devotes his third chapter ("The Non-Orthodox intermediate Zone," pp. 335-344) to the social-economic place that Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism and Islam hold in Southeast Europe. He concludes that wherever Catholics or Protestants settled among Orthodox, a quickening of economic development appeared. Such a highly interesting contention regarding the Greek Orthodox world will require special study. His statements about this insensitivity will be examined below.

consequences for family size and solidarity, premature weddings, over-population, slight internal and external migration, slow industrial development, lack of differentiation in trades, weak commercial activity, the influence of foreign capital flowing into this world, a closed up self-sufficient economy, the small purchasing power of the population, and generally static economic behaviour (362-367).

This analysis, MA believes, supports his original position that civilization consists of a uniform whole whose component parts are held together by a unifying principle. Conscious of other factors, he has to acknowledge the power of the great metaphysical systems. Even though the Orthodox Church refrained from any direct intervention in the lives of its followers, it nonetheless held their souls closely in its grasp and thus brought about the consequences mentioned above.

MA sees his findings as confirmation for those corollaries in the sociology of religion referring to the "chemistry" of the transformation of dogma into structure and/or the atmosphere of human existence (367-370).

The Dialectic between Assumption (*Πρόληψις*) and Repulsion (*Ἀπωεῖς*)

Before discussing certain positions of MA, it seems necessary to briefly consider to what degree he sees the basic principle governing Orthodox behaviour toward worldly concerns as in line with reality. Taking this principle as authoritative, MA finds the main characteristic of Orthodoxy its escaping or turning away from the "world," the insignificance attributed to everything mundane, its indifference toward history and the course and fate of man in history. In MA's work this view seems to take on the strength of a dogma which, according to Max Weber's theory, *should* have had a certain influence on the general life of the Orthodox peoples, especially on their economic activities.

We hope to show that this principle is insufficient when applied to an authentic and full description of the Orthodox attitude toward the secular world. In general, Eastern asceticism may have more fully and clearly preserved the eschatological trends of primitive Christianity and thus brought about an eschatological way of thinking in the whole Orthodox Church. This fact, however, neither favoured a dualistic conception of the world (which appeared along with other heretical views and was clearly condemned as a heresy by the Church), nor did it result in a friendlier stance toward the world which was still regarded as leading to perdition. On the contrary, closer examination reveals two parallel trends which we shall call *assumption* and *repulsion* of the world. In what follows, we shall attempt to understand these trends by considering certain theological and historical facts.

At first glance, the terms appear to be opposites; however, we will show that they form a dialectic relationship of completing and correcting one another. It was precisely through this dialectic relationship that the Church succeeded in confronting trends of the first centuries which

threatened to lead it into extremes of one-sidedness. Thus, for example, the antithesis of God, Christ and the Church versus the "world" was not understood in a gnostic-dualistic way but theologically, christologically and anthropologically. Accordingly, the repulsion of the world was seen as a mandate deriving from the fact of sin, the fall and apostasy, whereas in the theandric Church the renewal of the world is lived and experienced as eucharistically given to God. This "anaphora" is understood as a return, that is, a reversion of the course of the world from its fall to its reconciliation, from its destruction to its transformation. It is not without reason that Pentecost iconography portrays the world as an elderly man with outstretched arms and his eyes focused on the fiery flames of renewal. In the mystery of universal renewal and apokatastasis (re-establishment), the world now free from Satan is overcome, and the relationship between the individual Christian and the world is one of responsible and creative intimacy.

Furthermore, after its encounter with Gnosticism in a field which the Orthodox Church can claim as its very own, three additional controversies were won whose outcome has subsequently determined the Church's position on culture in general and, consequently, economic matters. The repudiation of Nestorianism preserved theandric unity and avoided the definite separation of the divine from the human, the holy from the profane. The repudiation of Monophysicism preserved the human being from the "threat" of the divine and averted the formation of a magical hierocratic civilization. Finally, the repudiation of Pelagianism protected man against self-reliance and the utopia of a conceited and arrogant humanism.

Thus, the foundations were laid for a dialectical attitude of mind towards worldly matters which has characterized the Eastern Church ever since. This position found its full expression in Dostoyevsky's work which describes the extreme debasement of the Social by the Metaphysical.⁹ For such a mentality, some of MA's remarks correspond to reality. For example, the things of this world are irrelevant to the mystery of salvation. No effort is made to regulate the mundane through moral directives. The sanctifying means and disciplinary authority of the Church are not used to guide human lives in a prescribed direction. Finally, the anxious concern for the soul's salvation dominates the incessant "Kyrie eleison" of the Hesychasm.

⁹ Comparing Dostoyevsky with Tolstoy, Oswald SPENGLER (*Der Untergang des Abendland*, II, Munich, 1923) states that the former represents the genuine Orthodox spirit, that which "knows no problems," "is not enlightened," "nor being socially oriented," "sees beyond the social." All worldly things are indifferent to it. For this reason it does not desire to "correct the world of reality" since, indeed, "a religion which exhausts itself in confronting social problems has ceased to be a religion" (*Ibid.*, 235). Dostoyevsky is the saint while Tolstoy is the rebel, the Bolshevik (*Ibid.*, 236). "For while the following millenium belongs to Dostoyevsky's Shristianity (What optimism on the day following the revolution!), Tolstoy's Christianity was a misunderstanding"; "he spoke about Christ but he meant Marx" (*Ibid.*, 237). Understanding Christianity in such a way, i.e., as a social revolution, is a western, materialistic conception; it is "the most extreme debasement of the metaphysical by the social" (*Ibid.*, 236).

With these things in mind, MA concludes: "The Eastern Church having resigned from the attempt to project certain demands on the everyday life of her faithful (which demands in the West, led to a methodical bio-culture, an ascetic passion for work (*Arbeitswille*), and direct rewarding or economic and commercial success), created an atmosphere of life in which the power of religious belief was kept within the ecclesiastical sphere without becoming a regulating factor for the regeneration and renewal of the mundane" (355).

Here, MA is apparently taking the attitude of one part, and certainly not the greater part, and generalizing it into an absolute to the detriment of the historical reality which *Realsoziologie* research should have kept in mind. Such generalizing characterizes many Western authors who get used to thinking in terms of the dialectic of antithesis and conflict rather than one of mutual correction and complementarity. Hence they speak of "kosmofyge" (retreating from the world) in the Eastern Church, because it does not follow the Roman mentality and tactics of confronting civil authorities and not subjecting everyday life to a kind of "p a r a k r a t i k o n" (state within a state) system of behaviour. We shall examine the East's understanding of the Church-state (world) relationship later, but what must be stressed here is that MA's review of the social rôle played by Orthodoxy originates with a one-sided opinion, and this fact more or less prejudices the whole result of his research. We hope to show that Orthodoxy not only repulses (*kosmofyge*) the world, but also assumes it. This transformation of the world into a Kingdom of God is celebrated, not authoritatively nor oppressively, but in the silence of mystery: "For one thousand years, in each phase of its historical and cultural life, Byzantium has realized the assumption of the natural, of the irrational and of the masses transforming them into a sacred history, *theandric koinonia*, that is, into *Ecclesia*, so as to achieve the historical incarnation of the Christological Dogma." ¹⁰

Unfortunately, in certain instances, this assumption reached such proportions that a stronger repulsion would have been desirable.

The Dialectic between the Real and the Ideal

The assumption-repulsion dialectic becomes more evident if examined as a dialectic between the real and the ideal in the history of the Church. MA maintains that a sociological investigation of Orthodoxy will reach the same conclusions as a sociology of Western religions, even if we ignored the economic, biological, climatic and cultural conditions of Eastern Europe and only based ourselves on the dogmatic teaching of the Orthodox Church (369). As we have seen above, Orthodoxy lacked the Calvinist doctrine of predestination which, according to Max Weber, proved so effective for economic development (354). Because of this lack and other characteristics which MA attributes to Orthodoxy, (immediacy of religious experience, disregard of worldly affairs, etc.), Orthodoxy should never have attained any effective inter-

¹⁰ Chr. YANNARAS, *The Privilege of Hopelessness* (in Greek), Athens, 1973, p. 102.

vention in the economic life of the East. Both this problem and the Greek Orthodox Church's attitude toward wealth deserve further consideration.

The ideal Christian attitudes towards wealth is rather clearly defined in the New Testament, yet we know how the early Church encountered the problem of wealth and related questions (private ownership, common ownership, non-ownership, etc.).¹¹ Among the trends which subsequently stabilized, we can distinguish two main ones showing varying degrees of tension. One of these trends moved towards repulsion, repudiating not only wealth but also every other form of ownership (slavery, for example). The ecclesiastical literature produced by this trend contains many newly coined terms revealing some very interesting psychic and social aspects of this attitude. One distinction is especially noteworthy. Some of the writers accept material things as "good" because they come from God, but renounce them in order to pursue a higher aim. Others reject material things as "evil."

This dualistic attitude is usually found in heretical circles and has always been condemned by the Church. Although the first trend often uses very negative labels for material things, these must not be taken in an absolute sense, because they refer to the "world" in its fallen state. Sometimes the denial of material goods is accompanied by a praise of poverty and affliction, which are seen as necessary for escaping the attractions of "the flesh" (Romans VIII, 5) and strengthening the Church's endurance in the face of temptation and conflict.¹²

The other trend, guided by the spirit of assumption of the world,

¹¹ Among the most recent related studies, see Archimandrite Nectarios HATJIMICHALIS, *Views concerning the Ownership of Property Prevalent in the Church during the First Three Centuries* (in Greek), Thessaloniki, 1972.

¹² During the Turkish occupation, monasticism switched to a plainer and more ascetic life that is idealized in the preaching of the dynamic missionaries of the times, as for example, St. Cosmas the Aetolian and the monk Christoforos Papoulakos. It was only natural that this type of idealization should find great response in the souls of the oppressed multitudes. All the utterances that K. Bastias places in the mouth of Papoulakos in his novel by the same name (New York, 1952, p. 223) are indicative of this spirit: "And what's more, I tell you that riches are a sin, for no one following the straight path of Christ ever became rich. For either he has wronged someone or everyone and for this reason, Christ reckons the rich man a sinner and says that the Kingdom of Heaven is closed to him. Therefore, do not seek sin and iniquity in order to eat better than your neighbour... And when a Christian possesses both these things (bread and water) and a garment... the rest are gifts of Satan. Enjoy, then, your poverty and do not complain, for a blasphemous mouth, a heavy heart, and thirst after the things of this world characterize only those who have lost sight of the image of heaven." Clearly contrasting the Calvinist view, the same work (p. 110) continues: "Whoever tells you that many riches are a blessing of God deceives you. Gold is Satan's great weapon and it is this that makes a man lie, steal, commit adultery; it makes him hard and leads him to murder. Learn, therefore, that the purpose of our life is the glory of God, and that only the righteous and the poor man's sleep is a quiet one." Cf. also D. TSAKONAS, *Introduction to Neo-Hellenism* (in Greek, Athens, 1958, pp. 115 and 136. Also cf. M. GIOLIAS, *Cosmas the Aetolian and His Times* (in Greek), Athens, 1972, which also includes a collection of this missionary's teachings to the enslaved Orthodox.

allows for the salvation of the rich man.¹³ God is the Creator of All, the One who gives everything in abundance, so both wealth and poverty become neutral. No one is saved merely because he is poor, nor can he be lost simply because he is rich. "Wealth is an instrument, you can use it justfully; it serves justification," assures Clement of Alexandria.¹⁴ "Because wealth as such is neither good nor evil, it can be judged according to the user's intention... poverty is not evil, wealth is not wicked," teaches Athanasius the Great,¹⁵ while according to Chrysotom, "wealth is not good nor poverty evil, they are indifferent."¹⁶

The Orthodox Church based its social and moral teachings on these principles which, although they did not directly influence economic matters, nevertheless thoroughly moulded the society in question. Regardless of the ethical neutralization of wealth described above, the Orthodox Church generally maintained a reserved attitude toward wealth. To be sure, wealth was not viewed as a metaphysical justification (e.g. as proving God's grace or a predestination to salvation), nor was it taken to legitimize property as something inseparably connected with the human being. In other words, Orthodoxy did not vest man with sacerdotal robes in order to "camouflage" its true nature and thus facilitate its grand entry into God's temple, the Church. On the contrary, even though it always held that nothing is so vain before God as the theology of vanity, it never hesitated to confront everything with the realistic criterion of death and the Last Days. "All that is human is vain and will not exist beyond death; riches do not remain, glory does not accompany..." reads the hymn of the funeral service.¹⁷ Given this vigilance, many liturgical texts prove that the necessities of life are part and parcel of the daily prayer of the Church.

But if the balance between repulsion and assumption represents the ideal, reality did not always show such balance. Unfortunately, no specific research has been carried out in this area, and we cannot pursue the subject here. What is said below is intended simply as a necessary correction of MA's basic views on Orthodoxy's position toward the world.

We could investigate the conflict between the repulsion and assumption of the world on the level of the individual Orthodox believer. But, since this believer is very closely bound to the ecclesiastical body and his attitudes are regulated by it, we prefer to examine the behaviour of the Church body itself. Here, especially, we can observe how the process of "schematismos" (conforming) the ideal to reality paralleled the change of the eschatological community into an "institution," and how,

¹³ This principle is expressed in basic ecclesiastical texts such as Clement of Alexandria's "Who is the Rich Man that is Saved?" or in St. Basil the Great's "To Those Who are Rich."

¹⁴ Clem. ALEX., *Quis dives salvetur* 14 (Migne, PG 9, 617C).

¹⁵ ATHANAS., *Hom. in Lc. 19, 36* (Migne, PG 28, 1037A).

¹⁶ CHRYSOSTOM., *Hom. 2, 4 in 2 Thess.*

¹⁷ In this sense, St. Cosmas (GIOLIAS, *op. cit.*, p. 345) commands: "Be careful, therefore, my brethren, that you are not proud... do not adorn the body, for the worms will (one day) eat it... fast, give alms, have death (constantly) before you, awaiting the time when you will leave this false world to go... to our true homeland."

after this process was completed, efforts were made to safeguard the quality of the ideal from the pressures of reality.

During the 3rd and 4th centuries, for example, the Church of Alexandria was a powerful spiritual centre which shaped the course of Christianity (theology, worship, monasticism, etc.). During that same time period, "the property owned by the Patriarchate of Alexandria was vast."¹⁸ When Athanasius the Great was patriarch, the Church had its own commercial fleet composed of riverboats for transport on the Nile and ships to sail the sea connecting Alexandria with other Mediterranean ports. All this shopping activity was for the benefit of the patriarchate. Already in the third century Christians had formed Christian nautical unions which faithfully served their bishops. The evidence shows that the Church of Alexandria was in a position to exert considerable economic and political pressure on the Byzantine emperor through its fleet. The behaviour of patriarch Theophilus is clear enough.

Economically, it was only natural that the ecumenical patriarchat in Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, become even more powerful. Income from real estate in the country and urban areas as well as from workshops (mills, vineyards, etc.), dioceses and parishes created an economic dynamism with strong effects on the life of Byzantium.¹⁹ The establishment of the rank of "oikonomos" together with the honour and power he acquired in the Church testifies to its wealth.²⁰ Other Orthodox churches underwent a similar process.

Economic reality also played a rôle in the life of monasticism. The individual monk owned no property and took a vow of poverty, but the monasteries very soon freed themselves from such obligations. Thus, the combination or comprise of a "poor monk in a wealthy monastery" became possible.

Even the very ascetic Egyptian monasticism had to take a clear and realistic stand on material goods almost from the very beginning. Already

¹⁸ See B. STEPHANIDES, *Church History* (in Greek), Athens, 1948, p. 169, n. 12.

¹⁹ For the general financial situation of the Church, see J. PAPADOPOULOS, "The sacred monies during the ancient Greek and Byzantine periods" (in Greek), *Epeteris (Annual) of the Society for Byzantine Studies*, Athens 19 (1949), pp. 189-193. M. WINKLER, "Einkommenverhältnisse des Klerus im christlichen Altertum" in *Theologisch-Praktische Monatschrift* 10 (1900). G. FORTS, E. HERMAN, "Zum kirchlichen Benefizialwesen in byzantinischen Reich" in *Studi Byzantini* 5 (1939), pp. 657-671. By the same author, "Das bischöfliche Abgabewese im Patriarchat von Konstantinopel vom XI. bis zur mitte des XIX. Jahrhunderts" in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 5 (1939), pp. 454-513. A. KNECHT, *System des justinianischen Kirchevermögensrechtes*, Stuttgart, 1905. A. VASILIEV, *Justin the First. An Introduction to the Epoch of Justinian the Great*, Cambridge, Mass., 1950, pp. 252-253, 344.

²⁰ The office of *Oikonomos* (steward), inferred by Canons 7 and 8 of the Council of Gangra, is clearly established as obligatory for all dioceses by the Council of Chalcedon (Canon 26). The 2nd Canon of the same Council which forbids the granting of this office in exchange for money alludes to the office's existence and value. It is known fact that *oikonomoi* of rich dioceses had an entire staff of assistants at their disposal. Justinian (Cod. I 2,24) sets the number of *chartoularioi* (assistants) to the *oikonomos* of St. Sophia at 100. This indicates both the extent of the "Great Church's" property and the care taken in its administration. Cf. H.G. BECK, *Kirche und theol. Literatur im byz. Reich*, Munich, 1959, pp. 100 ff.

the great pioneer teacher of the desert, Pachomius, quickly organized his vast monastic community in such a way that only a clearly rationalistic technical-economic perception could possibly govern it.

The enormous production of this great ascetic spell, or what might be called a group mania, forced the "chemistry of transformation" to change the ideal into a creative realism. The 50,000 monks not only provided for their basic needs, but also constituted a tremendous working potential which could be profitably used and developed. Thus, renowned technical workshops were organized with specialists and craftsmen working in them. A merchant fleet was acquired, and all aspects of a commercial market came into play.²¹

The transition from anchoritism to the monastic cenobion occurred in almost the same way, but this transition was both politically and economically motivated (apart from its purely ecclesiastical and theological foundations). Anchoritism, unstructured as it was, could not be easily controlled, disciplined or developed in a set direction. This became particularly evident during the first phase of iconoclasm in the 8th century. During the second phase however, monasticism, concentrated in wealthy and highly organized cenobia, had a decisive effect on church policy and occasionally on state affairs as well.

A prototype of this kind of activity is the Monastery of Studion.²² Although we must be cautious about the statistical computations of remote periods in time, it seems that the gradual increase of monastic property the last phase of the Byzantine Empire had reached a point where the monasteries owned almost half of the land available (while a great part of the remaining land was owned by the class of the "powerful" as we shall see below).²³ The monasteries' extension of ownership and their transformation of free farmers into "hierodouloi" (servants of the holy) gave them great control over the basic factors of rural economy: the land and the work force. In the following section we shall trace the consequences of this situation on the structure, social life and destiny of the Empire.²⁴ The Church's relation to the economy remained largely the same in the post-Byzantine period, with some notable differences which we shall mention below.

We can conclude our rather summary treatment in the following way.

The Church's vicissitudes in its relationship with wealth prove that the reality of "this world" leaves room for the ideal only under steady and determined vigilance. Throughout the centuries when the Church swerved from its ideal, it often encountered intense opposition from those who wanted its spirituality to remain intact. Because of this dialectic

²¹ Cf. Carl ANDRESEN, *Die Kirchen der alter Christenheit*, Stuttgart, 1971, p. 435.

²² H.G. BECK, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

²³ D. SAVRAMIS, *Zur Soziologie des byzantinischen Mönchtums*, Leiden/Köln, 1962, *passim*.

²⁴ Apostolos VKALOPOULOS follows these developments in his work, *The History of Neo-Hellenism* (in Greek), Thessaloniki, 1961. This work stands out for the light it sheds upon the social correlation of historical phenomena. Concerning the subject in question see vol. I *passim*. Cf. P. CHARANIS, "On the social structure and economic organisation of the Byzantine Empire in the thirteenth century and later," *Byzantino-slavica* 12 (1951).

relationship, the claims of the ideal did not completely disappear under the pressures of reality. Reality proves that MA has adequately stressed the principle of the repulsion of the world.

However, the attitude of the monks and clergy toward material goods does not hinder the economic activity of the people, as MA might lead us to expect. On the contrary, some monasteries became centres of pilot economic activity, often contributing to the general development of the economy of an area and encouraging a spirit of industry, diligence and the responsible handling of material goods.

At this point it would be very interesting to examine why, despite monastic pressure on the rural population and the state, no strong revolutionary trends developed and why the reform movements did not achieve more direct and lasting results.²⁵ This question does not fall within the scope of our analysis. We could also examine to what extent the tremendous increase in monastic property was consciously accepted by the Church and tolerated by the state. Similarly, we might consider how the conqueror became the main embezzler of the national wealth during the Turkish domination, and how the monastic preservation of Church property (due to recognized privileges) amounted to a protection of the national wealth.

All this differentiates reality and lessens the gap between the real and the ideal, thus providing a more profound justification for the economic activity of the Church in the conscience of the nation.

Orthodoxy, Social Differentiation and Economy

According to MA, Orthodoxy's denial of the world had another consequence which very negatively influenced economic life at that time. The Church's withdrawal from the world did not favour the creation of counterforces such as a priest class comparable to that of the Roman Catholic Church, a class of feudal lords, an urban class, free cities, etc., which would have been in a position to check state centralism and intervention and promote free development of the economy. In other words, according to MA, Orthodoxy did not favour the differentiation of society, but accepted a social structure which allowed the state to control the whole of social reality.

It is not possible to discuss the problem of Church-state relations in Byzantium here. This has been adequately dealt with before. But MA's position requires clarification.

²⁵ Thus, for example, the movement of the "Zealots" during the mid-fourteenth century was motivated by Hesychasm and in part framed within it (because of the hesychasts' sympathy for the suffering masses of plain folk); similarly, Gemistos' great movement for the spiritual and social renaissance of Byzantium. For more on this see J. MEYENDORFF, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas*, Paris, 1959, pp. 134 f. It seems that there was no longer any leeway for healing the crisis. See for example, D.A. ZAKYTHINOS, *Crise monétaire et crise économique à Byzance du XIIIe au XVe siècle*, Athens, 1948. G. MANTZARIDES, *Palamika* (in Greek), Thessaloniki, 1973.

It can reasonably be maintained that Orthodoxy cautiously favoured social differentiation. Guided by the principle of one body in Christ and the democratic spirit of the Hellenic tradition, the Greek Orthodox Church clearly represents an attempt to overcome the differences and antitheses within the human community. Therefore, there was no theological justification for raising the clergy above the people and creating a separate social class like that in the medieval West.²⁶

But it is clear that, from a sociological viewpoint, the existence of a building (ecclesiastical property and the power it represents) is more important than the question of whether or not theoretical basis exist for its construction. And all this is independent of the question (which we cannot deal with here) of the extent to which the mystical neo-Platonic theology of the "Hierarchy of Heaven" (e.g. the writings of a Dionysius the Aeropagite) did or did not influence the formation of Byzantine society or justified pre-existing social distinctions. It would also be interesting to investigate the relationship between the rubrics of Church services and the ceremonies of the palace, as well as some of the portrayals in Orthodox iconography.

Because MA maintains that the basic principles underlying the structure of the Orthodox peoples originate in Byzantium, we shall investigate the issue of sociological differentiation and the rôle played by the Church in its development. This question will be studied in the light of modern byzantinological research, particularly two of its phenomena, namely, aristocracy and feudalism.

MA notes the absence of a genuine noble class throughout the whole Orthodox world. Wherever such a class appeared in the East (Byzantine "aristocracy," the bojars of Roumania, the caste of nobles in Czarist Russia), he says, it was merely a social distinction absolutely dependent on the state and consequently without any relevance for the genuine aristocracy of the West (360).

The East never really had a class of nobles which society considered as something natural and indisputable, and whose privileges and hereditary rights were accepted as such. It would indeed be difficult for such an aristocracy to find a place within Orthodox ecclesiology.

What was known in Byzantium, however, was a social stratification showing widespread differentiation and a certain class of people enjoying an elevated position in the state and the nation. Professional differentiation as well as that of state offices and services do not directly concern us here. The same is true of the aristocracy acquired through money; it was formed because the state used to sell certain

²⁶ The use of a great many pompous titles and offices could be interpreted as a temptation for the clergy to exalt themselves above the laity. This temptation became even greater because of the Byzantine emperor's generous distribution of offices. Yet, the clergy's awareness of their roots in the lay class and the democratic values of the people (who reacted successfully against such tendencies; see, for instance, Byzantine satire!) averted this danger. MA considers this development a disadvantage, because the Church did not become a counterforce against the State (360). Orthodoxy's entire history, however, proves that it owes a large part of its authority and strength precisely to the "popularity" (i.e., their belonging to the popular class) of its clergy.

honourary offices which brought their bearers valuable state taxes, economic and other benefits.²⁷ We are primarily concerned with the class of people who were able to mass considerable economic power and, as a result, decisively influence the life of the Empire. This class originated with the great land owners of the Roman Empire and was preserved in Byzantium. Reform movements in the rural districts at the beginning of the 7th century attempted to restrict this class, but no permanent results ensued. The state favoured free small landholders and the soldiers (*coloni*) who settled in the remote areas, which they colonized and cultivated with tax exemptions, but this did not prevent the large land owners from gradually regaining strength, especially after the Empire was organized into large regions called "themata." The "aristocracy of the themata" came between the state and the people and took advantage of both sides. Through certain oppressive measures which the state was not able to control, this aristocracy of great land owners converted the free small landholders into a dependent proletariat, salaried personnel and serfs. At the same time, slaves of various ethnic backgrounds were employed on a large scale.

This development led to a huge gap between this aristocracy and other "dynatoi" ("powerful") and the poor class.²⁸ The latter became increasingly dependent on the nobles for protection against state oppression in the form of taxes, fines, confiscations, etc. At various times their miserable condition reached such a peak that the Byzantine Empire was eventually forced to grant tax relief to the weaker classes and protect the slaves from the arbitrariness of the wealthy class.

²⁷ We have reputable testimony that certain clerics with financial power were involved in the buying and selling of offices. They were thus able to win influence over the administration of various eparchies. See SOCRATES, *Church History* 7, 13, 9; cf. also 7, 7, 4.

²⁸ Apostolos Vakalopoulos speaks of the wide gap separating these social classes, which leads us to ask to what degree does MA's contention that the upper classes in the Orthodox world were insensitive to the lower classes hold true? (Cf. note 8). Possibly MA had in mind certain descriptions of social misery contained in Russian literature. But a generalization of this is probably unfair. The kerygma indicates that the Church was aware of and bothered by this problem without being awakened to its existence through the influence of heretical circles as MA seems to maintain. Moreover, the great and, in many ways, pioneering philanthropic work of the Church of Byzantium is well known. This certainly presupposes not only catastrophes from without (e.g., constant wars, epidemics, earthquakes, etc.), but also irregularities from within (e.g., the various forms of social injustice). Yet, many Western writers characterize Orthodoxy as the "Johannine Church," and focus on the more universal spirit of philanthropy and altruism that dictated interpersonal relationships within Orthodox society, despite the aforementioned antitheses. A comparative study based on more recent events and showing us to what extent, in the West mainly, it seemed impossible to stem the loss of this spirit during the transition from a philanthropic rural society to the financial rationalism of the manufacturers and merchants would be most useful. For the social work of the church of Byzantium see the detailed study by D. CONSTANTELOS, *Byzantine Philanthropy and Social Welfare*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1968. In his *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium*, Oxford, 1961, Ernest BARKER publishes translations of exceptional interesting texts concerning this subject as well as other problems touched upon here. Concerning the situation in the agricultural world of Byzantium, see G. ROUILLARD, *La vie rurale dans l'empire byzantin*, Paris, 1953.

The independent agricultural enterprises which came into existence (e.g. the *agridia*, the *idiostata*-independents, the *proasteia*) in connection with the concentration of political and military authority in the hands of the "powerful," brought about the conditions for a feudalistic decay of the Byzantine economy and society. MA, of course, denies that feudalism existed in Byzantium (358). Similar doubts are also expressed by certain byzantinologists who see feudalism as typical of and only functioning in the West. In fact, Orthodoxy's cenobitic-democratic spirit could not possibly have encouraged feudalism. The Byzantine "feudal lords" and "nobles" were formed by the circumstances of a given period of time. Compared with the Western prototype, they were not aristocracy *de jure*, but, what is decisive from a sociological viewpoint is that they were nobles and lords *de facto* due to the economic consequences of their concentration of wealth and power and their influence on domestic and foreign state policy.²⁹ We may even assume that, because they were not accepted by the public or legally and permanently privileged by the state or through heredity,³⁰ it was only reasonable that they hasten to acquire as much property and take as many profits as they could. This is why they became so oppressive for the lower classes and the state.³¹

The eminent historian G. Ostrogorski describes this situation as follows :

Dans les rangs des représentants supérieurs de la nouvelle organisation des thèmes, se forme graduellement une nouvelle couche aristocratique. Le processus de féodalisation de l'Empire byzantin commence par le renforcement de cette nouvelle aristocratie des thèmes. À partir du VIII^e siècle déjà apparaissent à Byzance des familles de magnats isolées, et cent ans plus tard, la noblesse s'affirme définitivement comme une caste privilégiée ; à partir de cette époque, sa propriété foncière s'accroît de plus en plus rapidement. Les terres des paysans et des soldats passent aux mains des gros propriétaires, 'les puissants' (*dynatoi*), et leurs titulaires, les 'pauvres' (*tochoi*, *penetes*), se transforment en parèques sur les terres des nobles ou des monastères.³²

According to the testimonies of *novelles* issued in the 10th century, this development led to the formation of a counterforce which

²⁹ See E. FRANCÈS, "La féodalité et les villes byzantines au XIII^e et XIV^e siècles," *Byzantinoslavica* 16 (1955), 85 ff.

³⁰ At any rate, by the middle of the 13th century the Paleologian dynasty had begun to give way before the demands of the military oligarchy and established a hereditary basis for rights and offices. See CHARANIS, *op. cit.* pp. 94 f., VAKALOPOULOS, *op. cit.*, pp. 89 f.

³¹ A similar phenomenon is the "archontologi" of the Venetian occupation and the "Kotzambasedes" of the Turkish domination, although some maintain (for example, M. SAKELLARIOU, *The Peloponnese during the Second Turkish Occupation 1715-1821* (in Greek), Athens, 1939, p. 135; and K. SATHAS, *The Archontologion in Zakynthos and the Popolaroi* (in Greek), Athens, 1867, pp. 3 ff.) that the latter remained more faithful to the Greek Orthodox tradition and did not depart to a great degree, spiritually and socially, from their likewise enslaved brethren.

³² G. OSTROGORSKIJ, "La commune rurale byzantine," *Byzantion* XXXII (1962), 153-154.

became quite troublesome for the state : " Entre le pouvoir impérial et la noblesse féodale commence une lutte longue et exaspérée." ³³

The centralizing power of the Byzantine Empire, which MA condemns, was neither stable nor indisputable at that time ; and, more important, it was not always successful. On the contrary, " feudalization " opposed " etatisation " with such force that it not only led to the disintegration of the bureaucratic machinery, but ultimately brought about the dissolution of the structure and, eventually, the existence of the state.

Orthodoxy theoretically took a reserved or clearly negative position this development, as the " social preaching " and works of the great Eastern Fathers demonstrate. But we can positively assert that Church support of the state was connected with and motivated by the state's struggle against the " powerful " class which tyrannized the weaker members of the Church.

However, if we consider the great wealth of the monasteries and the Church, we shall realize why nevertheless the Church was often on the side of the " powerful " opposing both the people and the state. With this in mind, the interpretation of many facts of the ecclesiastical and social history of Byzantium would come closer to the truth.

Over the years, not only the " powerful," the nobles, the feudal lords and monks, but also the people threatened the state. The people threatened the state. The people can even be considered a permanent Given the power and arbitrariness of the Byzantine emperors, it may seem highly paradoxical to characterize the state structure of Byzantium sociologically as a royal democratic cenobion. But, as we have stated before and MA recognizes too, this state actually preserved certain elements of democracy.

MA even proceeds a step further characterizing the Byzantine Empire as a " people's " state (*Volksstaat*) despite its authoritative and hierarchical structure. And he does so because, as he says, the people were excluded from the throne a priori in the West (358), while in Byzantium the throne was not just reserved for certain privileged families. Usually, it was occupied by men of the people, and sometimes even by those who came from the lower strata of the population. We might add that the lay mechanism controlling state authority not only functioned during the election and elevation of emperors but also in the general life of the state. From the numerous pertinent testimonies available, we select that of the eminent byzantinologist K. Krumbacher who states : " The emperor's dependence on the will of the people, the bloody insurrections of the masses in the capital, and other similar democratic characteristics revealed by zealous observers of the Byzantine civilization remind us of modern France rather than of the years prior to 1789." ³⁴

Now if we consider that the Church is not only patriarch and clergy but, even more, the laity, we must ask whence this Orthodox body

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

³⁴ K. KRUMBACHER, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*, Greek trans. by G. Soteriades, vol. I, Athens, 1897, pp. 2 f.

of the Byzantine Church derived its democratic mind, existing, as it did, in a state whose ruler could not usually have been described as democratic? We believe that the source must be sought in the Hellenic democratic tradition³⁵ mentioned before which, having survived due to the great Hellenic-centred work of the Church Fathers and Teachers, had been transformed into a conscious brotherhood and solidarity within the liturgical and eucharistic community of the Orthodox Church. MA seems to sense this when he writes that the majority of the people, united in the common faith, actively participated in the life of the empire and thus its life was governed by "the specific dialectic of simultaneously being state and Church in one, hierarchic order and democratic cenobion" (358).³⁶ This is why we believe that the terms usually employed to describe the Churchstate relationship in Byzantium (symphony, caesaro-papism, etc.) are late forms applied retroactively to a system whose structure and identity were something unique in the history of mankind.

The problem which arises now is this: it is a fact that the Orthodox Church had a democratic people under its influence; it held a powerful weapon against state absolutism in its hands; whenever it used this weapon, it manifestly proved the power of the people (in negative and positive ways), — so why did it not use this weapon more effectively to support the formation of counterforces between the state and the people towards a wider differentiation, and why, instead, did it usually discourage such developments? The answer, we believe, must lie in the political theology which came into being very early in the East. The presuppositions, contents and consequences of this policy are too involved to be treated here. We will mention only the following.

It is true that in Byzantium "the spiritual and temporal authorities were combined into a unity which is almost unique in history" (346). From this unity a "theocratic state" developed (*theokratisches Staatswesen*) (346); but we believe that MA gives the term "theocratic" more importance than it actually had in Byzantium.³⁷ The unity which arose, however, was certainly dialectic. M8 justifiably states that the Church established a relationship of willing obedience to the state. But he also concedes that the structure and identity of the Byzantine state show the influence of Orthodox dogma (346).

To describe this relationship in extreme terms, we might say that Orthodoxy preferred to exist as an *all-powerless Church* within an

³⁵ See E. BARKER, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 ff.

³⁶ MA even interprets the Orthodox rejection of papal primacy as a social rejection by the many of the authority of the one (p. 348). This explanation is inadequate because it overlooks other basic aspects of the problem, and most importantly, the ecclesiological aspect. MA's view does, however, justly extol the democratic mind of Byzantine Orthodoxy.

³⁷ Despite the depth and dimension occupied by the divine and sacred in Byzantine civilization, it cannot be described as "hierocratic" in the same way that Judaic, Brahmanian and, in part, Islamic civilization are so characterized. See Al. PAPADEROS, "Civilization" (in Greek), article in the *Religious and Moral Encyclopaedia*, vol. 10 (1967), 507 ff. See also his article on "Christianity and Civilization," vol. 12 (1968), 187 ff.

all-powerful state. This "all-powerless" situation did not however lead to a "religious idealization of the state" (359) as could be said of certain trends in Lutheranism. We are not referring to the bishops' or patriarchs' conflicts with the rulers and emperors of Byzantium. Albeit frequent and impressive, they simply certified and strengthened the power of the state. Rather we want to point out that the Orthodox Church, having renounced an antagonistic rôle vis-à-vis the state, undertook the mission of being its critical conscience. This mission was successful, primarily because of the encouragement of the democratic-minded people of the Church (that is, the citizens of the state), and because of the development of a particular political theology. In this theology the state found its metaphysical justification, but at the same time the emperor acquired a clear and conscious understanding of his responsibility and the extent of his authority under the austere eyes of Christ the Pantocrator.

In one of our studies,³⁸ we emphasized that human life in its then unified ecclesiastical and social dimensions was understood as the celebration of a *liturgy*; everyone concelebrated, hierarchically and according to the dignity and responsibility of his rank, but all shared a common eucharistic and doxological disposition. Viewed in the light of such liturgical cooperation of powers and services and not with a modern secularized autonomistic and antithetic understanding, the Byzantine "harmony" reveals its true depth and genuine quality.

From this angle, it seems that the Orthodox Church of Byzantium, encompassing the state by its metaphysical authority and reserving for itself prayer and silence, often became "serviceable to state interests" (359). The Church's renunciation certainly strengthened the state's centralistic tendencies and hindered the economy in many of the sectors MA mentions. But an economy is not an autonomous and separate part of civilization; it is one of the ways in which a culture finds expression and by which it can also be classified on a certain scale of values. Classification determined the framework and rhythm for realizing each of these values. In Byzantium the framework or underlying principle was a liturgical one which also established the presupposition for the survival of Church and empire, namely, unity. Thus, Church and state had vital interests in common and mutually helped each other. The state helped the Church meet the threat from sects and heresies, and the Church helped the state combat imminent external threats as well as internal dissolving forces such as the aristocracy of the "powerful" and also, to some extent, monasticism. Through its humility and "kenosis," Orthodoxy not only secured the unity of the state but also furnished the care-free inner condition necessary for the great prospects and healthy structures which enabled the "nation" (*genos*) to survive even when it was no longer a free state.

In the West, on the contrary, the opposition of Church and state favoured the economy and various interests of the Church and other

³⁸ Al PAPADEROS, "Das liturgische Selbst- und Weltbewusstsein des byzantinischen Menschen," *Kyrios* IV (1964) Nr. 3, pp. 206-218.

classes, and may, in part, have encouraged economic development; however, in many ways, it also damaged both sides and public life in general. MA himself admits that the medieval state was a "static" (statisch) one because authority was dispersed in the free cities, the privileged nobility, the clergy, etc., and the state was unable to pursue forceful policies at home or abroad. Byzantium began its decline when the long lasting antagonism of the "powerful" and the rest of the Byzantine nobles and feudal lords rebelled against the state. The decline reached its climax with the ideological rupture between the "Orthodox" and the "Helleno-centred" and later between the unionist emperors and the anti-unionist clergy.³⁹ The tragic consequences of this loss of unity and the positive rôle it had played during the previous centuries have since become manifest. Given the general geographical and political conditions, we doubt very much whether the Orthodox Church should have contributed to enhancing the economy by favouring social differentiation more and strengthening the unity of the empire less.

Orthodox Conservatism and Economy

Due to limitations of space, we must confine ourselves to mentioning certain problems broached by MA that require specific sociological research.

The main question is the degree to which Orthodox conservatism positively or negatively influenced the social life of the empire. We must first examine conservatism itself, which MA takes for granted and which constitutes part of the Orthodox image. This not entirely unfounded image did not develop by chance, but results from a one-sided view. The conservative image overemphasizes traditional characteristics while ignoring the dynamic elements of Orthodox spirituality.

It is true however that, as time went on, some of the originally dynamic qualities in Orthodoxy became static. During the past century, a great dispute arose among prominent Greek theologians about the "nucleus" and "shell" problem in Orthodoxy.⁴⁰ This was perhaps the first bold attempt to critically examine the historical form of the Orthodoxy body. Such examination is necessary in dealing with the problem lying before us.

MA consider dogmatic conservatism as one of the factors negatively influencing Eastern economic development. Since dogma did not merge into everyday life, as it did in Calvinism, its creative impulse could not be transmitted to the activities of the faithful. And since Orthodoxy did not deem it necessary to further develop, interpret and intellectually fortify the contents of the faith as defined by the Synods, no intellectual interest was generated and no theological or

³⁹ A. VAKALOPOULOS, *op. cit.*, 148 ff., 252 ff.

⁴⁰ For details concerning the spiritual and cultural rearrangement wrought by the Enlightenment in the Orthodox world, see our study. *Metakenosis. Griechenlands kulturelle Herausforderung durch die Aufklärung in der Sicht des Korais und des Oikonomos*, Archiv für Vergleichende Kulturwissenschaft, Nr. 6, Verlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Blan, 1970, pp. 127 ff.

philosophical discussion stimulated which, as a result, would indirectly have advanced rational science and technology, as it had in the West.

This position is very questionable as far as Byzantium and Orthodoxy in the Hellenic are concerned. Actually, the East and the West did not understand and view the nature of dogma and its place in the Church in the same way. With only few exceptions, the East was not encouraged to set up a scholastic system like that of the West whose detailed system of ethics bound life to the point of asphyxiation, and whose uniform way of thought oppressed the *logos-ratio* to such an extent that the well-known reactions provoked by it worked to the Church's disadvantage but, in a way, to the advantage of science and life.

In the East dogma remained a simple boundary within which the faithful could securely move and satisfactorily praise God. This should by no means be interpreted as animosity toward rational thinking; Orthodoxy's devotion to "orthos dokein" (right thinking) is well known.⁴¹ But even the most rapid glance at history recalls how positively Orthodoxy always viewed the ancient philosophical (and consequently intellectual) heritage, but also the long and painful conflicts its theologians had about accepting, interpreting and defining the contents of faith. Every falsification or transgression of the dogmatic boundary produced strong reactions in the course of which naturally the *theological* aspects were brought to the fore (conflicts about the filioque, about hesychasm, confrontation with reformatory modern trends and heretical currents within Orthodoxy).

As regards science in the narrower sense of the term, it seems superfluous to repeat how Byzantium preceded the West in cultivating science, technology and letters, and how the Western world subsequently took advantage of these intellectual efforts. In Byzantium no separation occurred between theology and philosophy. There was no turn toward pure rationalism as in the West where theology and philosophy became antithetical. Generally speaking, as regards intellectual activity, the Greek Orthodox Church's assumption of the world has always been stronger than its repulsion. When the Holy Inquisition was not yet stilled in the West, the Greek clergy took up the daring task of effecting the metakenosis, that is, pouring into the subjugated nation the new spirit, the "lights of Europe," conveying to it the systems of Descartes and Galileo, translating manuals of the new knowledge in physics, mathematics and astronomy.⁴² Because Orthodoxy has always recognized

⁴¹ As we have mentioned elsewhere, in this "passion" for "believing correctly" "lebt die echt rationalistische Denkweise der Alten Hellene weiter, deren sich auch der Byzantiner bedient, um die Botschaft der Offenbarung in Begriffen überlegener Klarheit, Deutlichkeit und Vollzahl auszulegen." A. PAPADEROS, "Das liturgische," *op. cit.*, p. 217.

⁴² The Greek Orthodoxy's acquisition of the new critical, scientific spirit was accomplished much more easily and quickly than in the clerical and theological circles of the West. This is chiefly due to the Eastern spiritual tradition, but also to Orthodoxy's optimistic stand regarding knowledge. The scientific discovery of truth is gratefully acknowledged as a type of revelation of God Himself Who is the truth! For details about this reception of the new spirit, see A. PAPADEROS, *Metakenosis*, pp. 29 ff., 98-134.

truth as the revelation of God Himself, it believed that "all good things and every perfect gift are from above, coming down from the Father of Lights" (James 1:17 and also contained in a prayer of the Divine Liturgy).

If, then, we observe restraint in scientific, technological and, consequently, economic development, the cause must not be sought in Orthodoxy's turning away from the world, in its "mystical" and "antilogical" mentality, but in external factors. Actually, it was the intrusion of the West with its crusades — (the advancement of arts and letters in certain countries, Crete for instance, during the Venetian domination does not mitigate the general consequences of this event) which ended in the dissolution of the Byzantine Empire and the long Turkish oppression which followed.

This historical context more than the nature of Orthodoxy is responsible for certain other phenomena which MA mentions. He states, for example, that popular manners, costumes and customs as well as popular crafts were preserved in the East rather than in the West mainly because of the conservative mentality of Orthodoxy. We shall see below to what degree this may be true. MA attributes the rise of popular crafts in the East to two main factors: 1) Orthodoxy's attitude toward crafts in general, and 2) the lack of economic and educational rationalism. Orthodoxy, he maintains, often absorbed the mundane into the Holy, into a higher world, thus imposing on its adherents a strictly sacred art, particularly iconography, and not favouring any other kind of artistic activity (355). Even the metaphysically-laden austerity of hagiography and ecclesiastical architecture manifested a "grandiose one-sidedness" (356). For this reason, he continues, a vacuum arose which the popular arts came to fill. Apart from the wealth of individual expression, this process had the favourable effect of preserving ancient types and forms and giving us a vivid picture of the historical scene (256, cf. 364). The modern critical approach to artistic activity in Byzantium would have difficulty agreeing with such alleged "one-sidedness." We already stated that the Byzantine civilization cannot be considered as "hierocratic" or sacred in the true sense of the term; because of the unity of this cultural phenomenon, however, it is not conceivable that a non-hierocratic sector (e.g. art) should have existed within a hierocratic culture. Therefore, MA's explanation of the rise of popular art seems inadequate.

MA's view that Orthodoxy did not sufficiently encourage the development of trades is also objectionable. Unlike the Western Church, the Eastern Church was not anxious to dominate or express itself by creating magnificent and representative buildings and works of art. And this is why, MA says, the demand for trades, services and products was not strong, and analogous skills and activities did not develop which helped prepare the transition to the industrial age in the West. This position, we believe, fails to consider two items: 1) although the Orthodox Church never really aimed at conspicuous representation in the world, the Byzantine state accomplished this task for it by ordering the construction of uniquely magnificent ecclesiastical edifices; 2) the

innumerable monasteries and small, simple churches in the East definitely presuppose the activity of crafts which, seen as a whole, is probably not less than that of the West. We must not forget however that despite the all-powerlessness of Orthodoxy (particularly in Byzantium and at least until the Crusades), luxury and rich ornamentation favourably influenced the crafts which, as we know, reached a high degree of perfection much earlier than in the West.⁴³

If the East did not keep pace with Western technical and industrial developments, there are well-known historical reasons which explain this fact better than the ostensibly restraining rôle MA ascribes to Orthodoxy, however forceful its turning toward metaphysical values may have been. This was a time of high spiritual awareness for Orthodoxy in Byzantium.

One especially noteworthy historical condition is Byzantium's loss of the lead it had held for centuries in international commerce, and later had to relinquish to Venice and Genoa. This fact is also worth noting because MA sees Orthodoxy as lacking commercial spirit. According to him, this lack caused a void which foreign merchants (mainly Jews) came to fill. These merchants prospered in the Orthodox countries and foreign capital gained great power there (365 cf. also 335-344).

MA does not attribute this lack of commercialism to any concrete action on the part of the Orthodox Church, but rather to a general "weakness" within Orthodoxy because it did not favour the three basic characteristics of the Western mentality, namely, economic activity (*wirtschaftliche Aktivität*), rationalism (*Rationalismus*) and the "calculation-mindedness" or commercial spirit (*Rechnenhaftigkeit*), which Sombart considers the origin and chief motivating force behind capitalism. This threefold "weakness" coupled with Orthodoxy's general attitude toward worldly affairs does not encourage profit speculating.

While these positions are very interesting, they do not explain MA's assertion that "Only the Greeks are endowed with special commercial qualifications" (365). This phenomenon, which must be considered the very core of the issue "Orthodoxy and Economy," MA passes over in a single sentence. Apparently either the Greeks were not good Orthodox believers, or the rest of the Orthodox people were not good merchants, not because they were better believers but for other reasons, their spiritual makeup, their culture or historical coincidences. Such serious issues can only be treated in a special study.⁴⁴

⁴³ See A. SIDERIS, *History of Financial Life* (in Greek), I, Athens, 1950, pp. 273 f.

⁴⁴ We will only mention the following here. The Christian Church, recalling the temptation of Mammon, generally viewed commerce with reservation. Certain Fathers and teachers of the Church (e.g., Tertullian) even denied the necessity of commerce and trade. During the Middle Ages this stand was expressed in the following axiom: *nullus christianus debet esse mercator* (see L. BRENTANO, *Ethik und Volkswirtschaft in der Geschichte*, 1909, p. 5).

In the West, it was not difficult to support this conception, because at the end of the medieval period, commerce had just begun to play a significant role in its economic life. Afterwards, we witness a gradual departure from this severe view. Trading profits are made morally lawful as a reward for labour (Thomas Aquinas), while during the 15th century St. Anthony, consistent with the noteworthy socio-

MA regards the forms preserved in rural life and particularly the stability of the family as an institution as additional evidence of Orthodoxy's conservative influence. Apart from certain details, we have no serious objections to MA's remarks; however, the institution of the family should be examined within the much broader framework of the family relationships which play a very special rôle in Orthodox society.

economic changes that had occurred, accepts so many concessions regarding the morality of business, that it becomes altogether apparent that the impersonal powers influencing the reality of the market have been recognized and accepted. (See R.H. TAWNEY, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, 1929, p. 41).

In the East the Church had to face mercantilism as a given reality from the very beginning. It had assumed great proportions in Byzantium. Moreover, not only trade but also *retailing* — mostly as a parasitical occupation — flourished among the peoples of the Byzantine Empire; a general business spirit prevails in this part of the world even now (see W. HEYD, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen âge*, Leipzig, 1903, vol. 2).

Because of this given reality, then, the Church in the East could not take a uniform stand condemning commerce as a whole. In her general kerygmatic and pastoral activities, the Church stigmatized the aberrations of business as well as those of other professional activities. The scenes depicting unfair merchants being punished in Hell, found in icons of the Last Judgment, are especially noteworthy here (see our study on the sociology of Orthodox iconography under publication). In the frescoes of the monasteries of Moldavia, for example, all the Armenians are collectively depicted among those destined for eternal damnation, apparently because of their business activities. Perhaps only the prevailing Hellenistic influence and the fact that the Greeks were of the same religion kept them from replacing the Armenians in these scenes (since for the Balkan peoples, Greek meant merchant!). In general, however, we are obliged to state that in the world of the Eastern Church, despite all reservations, the merchant found a more or less favourable climate for his activities. Other factors also contributed to this, for example, commerce's positive contribution to the work of Christian missions from the beginning of Christianity and throughout the centuries. It is well known that in certain instances the merchant accompanied the missionary expeditions as a sort of "expert on development" as we would call him now. Thus, Patriarch Photius and Emperor Michael III sent clerics, monks, technicians and merchants to accompany Cyril and Methodios on their expedition to the Slavic world which was in need of economic and cultural development. (V. STEPANIDES, *Church History*, pp. 369 ff.).

Another particularly important factor for our study is the connection between trade and the religious feast. This led to the phenomenon of "emporopanygeris" (trade-festival), i.e., the commercial exploitation of the great mass of pilgrims coming to the religious feast. Already known in antiquity, this phenomenon assumed such proportions that the Sixth Ecumenical Council, in its 76th canon, was obliged to forbid the buying and selling of goods in the churchyard. Despite this prohibition, the phenomenon still continues today. Indeed, it is a known fact that not only in the Holy Land but in many other areas as well, *Kerdoos Hermes* (Hermes who brings gain) was a regular devotee of Church festivals. Also worth mentioning is the *emporopanygeris* of St. Demetrios in Thessaloniki, truly a great international market, offering opportunities for international business transactions (A. SIDERIS, *op. cit.*, p. 250).

Again, familiarity with the mercantile spirit often facilitated its entrance into even the most sacred sectors of Church life (simony, gratuities for celebrating sacraments and church ceremonies in general, the buying and selling of sacred relics, etc.), especially where the clergy's income from other sources was limited.

Finally, we should recall the role that the migrant Greek merchant played in the community-parishes abroad. Because of their financial vigour, they always played a decisive and usually positive role in the life of community. Moved by pious dispositions, many of them became great benefactors of both migrant and metropolitan Hellenism, especially in the areas of education and social welfare; they also financed the greater part of the War of Independence in 1821.

MA justifiably refers to the great patriarchal families in the Balkans and Russia (364).

The Orthodox Church widens the circle of interpersonal relationships by adding spiritual relationships to blood relationships through the institution of paranyphos (bestman) in the sacrament of matrimony and that of synteknos (godparent) in the sacrament of baptism. The holiness of the sacrament gives these bonds a metaphysical dimension, and they sometimes last longer than those of blood relationship. Furthermore, the 53rd Canon of the Quintisext Synod formally recognized the spiritual relationship as superior to the physical.

Within this broader meaning of "family," a favourable climate was created for two important phenomena which MA rightly mentions: the increase in population (due to marriages at a young age, since the youth lived securely within their families) and the averting of the formation of a proletariat (also due to family protection).

This spiritual relationship also brings about additional marriage bans already recognized in the Justinian code imposed by ecclesiastical synods and still enforced by the Greek Civil Code today. Given the seclusion of the rural communities especially during the Turkish occupation, one can easily appreciate the importance of these additional marriage bans for the prevention of incest and, consequently the preservation of the health and therefore the industriousness of the people. The rôle these extended kinship bonds had in preserving the peace and developing pleasing interpersonal relationships and a spirit of cooperation and solidarity must also be taken into account.

MA's observation referring to the cohesive strength emanating from the conservative influence of Orthodoxy can be correctly appraised only when viewed in this larger perspective. But his observation remains one-sided if we fail to consider the influence of other external factors suspended and/or retarded the process of social shifting. During the Venetian and later the Turkish occupation, for example, the frightful opposition of adversaries of different faiths occurred. The presence of "the Frank" and "the Turk" amounted to a permanent threat continuing over many centuries. This threat certainly strengthened the bonds among Orthodox believers and discouraged any kind of egocentric individualism. The individual was forced into a "common lot"⁴⁵ in all situations of life. Under this pressure, interpersonal relationships could not be restricted to a family "ghetto." They became inter-family and inter-community, and at the same time, the subjugated faithful gained a broader and deeper awareness of their belonging to the large body of the Orthodox "genos" (nation).

This sharing of tort, torture, threat and fear laid the groundwork for the growth of a collective awareness or common consciousness which was successfully able to withstand the external threat. This consciousness reinforced two basic structures: the community and various forms

⁴⁵ D. DANIELIDES in his *Neo-Hellenic Society and Economy* (in Greek), I, Athens, 1934, pp. 129 ff., analyzes this matter and appropriately calls the Greek community during the Turkish occupation a "bond of brothers condemned to die."

of incorporation. Not only do they have special importance for clarifying the economic rôle played by Orthodoxy, but they are also related to the other question MA treats, namely, that in the Orthodox world there are no forms of autonomous co-existence in larger communities. While this is partly true of Byzantium, MA's viewpoint is not quite correct. According to him, the rural population did not produce enough to supply the urban centres (cf. below), which is not surprising given the size and vitality of many of the cities of Byzantium, some of which even managed to survive the Turkish occupation. True, the state centralism of the East did not leave much margin for the development of self-government in autonomous, genuinely free cities, but during the Turkish oppression the orthodox Greek communities did show a very typical formation and development which contributed decisively to their reorganization and the survival of the Greek nation.⁴⁶

In this context, it should be stressed that the community usually coincided with the parish (enoria) of which it usually was a product and to which it mainly owed its durability. Within this eucharistic society, the problems and needs of the individual and the whole community are assumed; within the solidarity of the cenobion, their solution is sought. At all times, and especially during the occupation, the parish was also the natural parliament of the "ragias" (the non-Moslem subjects of the Ottoman Empire) and the operational base for collective activities.

The same is true of the incorporations, i.e., the various forms of organized collaboration in trade corporations and cooperative partnerships. Many of these incorporations date back to ancient Greek society and the fellow craftsmen of the Roman *collegia*. They were under state control during the decline of the Roman Empire and in Byzantium, but due mainly to the autonomy of the parish, they became relatively independent during the Turkish occupation. Although these incorporations have not yet been examined from a socio-religious viewpoint, we can state that their pioneering character, solidarity, diligence and mutual responsibility did not result primarily from economic-organizational rationalism, but was rather the product of a common faith and the cenobitic conscience of their Orthodox members.⁴⁷ However, this

⁴⁶ Scholars agree that the Neo-Hellenic community constitutes a completely singular idiomorphic phenomenon through its birth, structure, and functioning. Among the other paradoxical phenomena which it exhibits is the fact that this community was able, under servitude, to develop autonomous moral-religious formation with broad economic, political, cultural and military activity. Cf. K. KARAVIDAS, *The Community* (in Greek), I, Athens, 1935. D. ZAKYTHINOS, "La commune grecque. Les conditions historiques d'une décentralisation administrative" in *L'Hellénisme contemporain* II, Athens, 1948. S. VISVISIS, "L'administration communale des Grecs pendant la domination turque" in *Annuaire de la prise de Constantinople. L'Hellénisme contemporain*, 1953, pp. 217-238.

⁴⁷ To what degree the *affectio societatis* (the disposition of these bodies to become companies) based itself "on the principles of brotherhood and the teachings of Christ" (Alice KIANTOU-PAMBOUKI, "Trade and mercantile law during the Turkish domination" (in Greek) in *Manual (Epeteris) of the Highest School of Manufacturing*, Thessaloniki, 1971, p. 45) is clearly seen in the well-known example of the "Common Company" of Ampelakia, which is expressive of the then prevailing spirit. This

contention does not deny the possibility that certain clever entrepreneurs may have exploited the faith of the others.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the fact that the Orthodox clergy often held governing positions in these incorporations (as a result of similar positions held in the life of the community) is one more instance of the need for correcting MA's statements about Orthodoxy's indifference to mundane concerns.⁴⁹

famous productive association (manufacture, dying and trading of cotton threads on the markets of Western Europe) was based on the cooperation of all the members of the community. Of course, theirs was a basically financial collaboration; however, its inspiration, structure and the mutual relationships between its members were not due to a pessimistic financial rationalism, but mainly to a spirit of solidarity and brotherhood. This is also shown in the two extant Constitutional Charters of 1780 and 1795. (Here we refer to the texts edited by Ch. ANAGNOSTIADES, *The Financial Structure and Legal Form of the Company of Ampelakia* (in Greek), Thessaloniki, 1973, and by giving the year in which it was composed, we refer to the analogous charter). From the viewpoint of our present study, we can note the following: The entire effort was undertaken "with (the grace of) Holy God," according to the first sentence of the Constitutional Charter of 1780. The gospel passage "where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them" (Matth. 18,20) is placed at the beginning of both charters. We are reminded that "the beginning of our most unblemished faith grew because it was based on unity... the company of those who believed were of one heart" (Acts 4, 32, 1780 article 1). "Truth" ("Thy word is truth from the beginning" Ps. 118, 160), "fear" ("The fear of God is clean, enduring forever," Ps. 18,10), and "reward" ("Moreover thy servants keep to them: and in the keeping of them there is great reward," Ps. 18,12), are added to the Constitutional Charter of 1795, which goes on to state: Thus, we the... merchants and manufacturers of red threads of this city of Ampelakia, basing our existence upon the cornerstone, on the very name of our Lord, have decided... (article 1). Continuing, the text becomes liturgical, eucharistic, and paschal, reminding us of the famous Catechetical Paschal Sermon of John Chrysostom: "in the name of our very master Christ, we have decided to renew and to form once again our common partnership and brotherhood, recalling our ancient customs and setting a common table, and with sublime heralding calling each and every brother of ours to come and to enjoy the common table and brotherhood, bring with him to the feast the proper dress: he who is prosperous (bringing with his the virtues of) generosity and brotherly love; he who is in need (the quality of) patience..." (1780 article 1). In a pioneering spirit, it is decided that employees will share in company profits. It is determined that in the distribution of the profits, the industry or slothfulness, the faithfulness or carelessness of the worker, "according to the divine and just saying, 'thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee a ruler over many things,'" (Matth. 25,21, 1790 article 2) are to be taken into consideration. The remaining regulations are also founded upon scriptural passages, while the 17th article of both charters has the characteristics of a prayer, oath and exorcism. It is precisely the shared mentality of the eucharistic community which inspires common action and leads to an economic vitality remarkable for the times and prevailing circumstances.

⁴⁸ This view is supported by Ionnis KORDATOS, *Ampelakia and the Myth of Its Company* (in Greek), Athens, 1973), who considers the insertion of scriptural passages as "so much dust in the eyes of the simpler and smaller shareholders" (p. 71). We consider this viewpoint arbitrary and thus in accord with the entire spirit of Kordatos' study, but also clearly opposed to the spirit of the Greeks of those times, witnessed in the letters which Kordatos himself goes on to publish. Cf. the following note.

⁴⁹ The Charter of 1780 (article 18) states that it was ratified by the local bishop. The biblical-liturgical language of the Charter as a whole as well as the activity of Bishop Dionysios of Platamon and Lkostonion leads us to believe that he played decisive role not only in the composition of the texts but also in the general organization of the "company," just as a bishop (Irenaios of Kissamos and Selynon) — to give an example of the survival of this cenobitic spirit — was a pioneer and even president of the most dynamic contemporary corporate activity with a wide popular base in Greece: the Navigational Company of Crete, Ltd.

In the light of contemporary trends, MA's remarks about the restricted amount of internal and external migration in Orthodox countries also requires examination. MA considers that their limited urbanization and industrial development are due to the cohesiveness of the conservative Orthodox family and its failure to supply town and industry with workers from the rural districts. We cannot follow the development of mobility in the Byzantine and post-Byzantine Greek territories, but we must insist that Orthodoxy contributed both negatively and positively to geographic mobility. Negatively, through enforced displacement which caused masses of people to move from their homes and partially change their ways of life because of religious conflicts.⁵⁰ We know that such forced migration often seriously affected Byzantine agriculture. Positively, because Orthodoxy's ecumenical spirit liberates man from closing himself up in a shell and from fearing all that is foreign and unknown, thus favouring emigration and stimulating mobility. In addition, the anchoretic-eschatological disposition of its teaching abolishes the magic spell of the fatherland, and, without depriving man of a country or home, favours his readiness and willingness to accept the whole world as his home (man is, in one way or another, a "stranger" in this world; "we have no city which remains here, but we seek that which is to come" — Hebrews 13:14). Encouraged positively by such a spirit and negatively by the occupation, the Greeks set out on the great exodus which climaxed after the fall of Constantinople in 1453) and formed large and wealthy Greek communities in the diaspora.⁵¹ Both these communities and those of contemporary Greek emigration retain the parish character not only in their organizational forms but also in their identity and attitude of mind.

The dominating spirit of family cohesion and solidarity is by no means a secondary factor in attracting more emigrants to leave their fatherland and become members of the diaspora. Turkish dominated Greece witnessed mobility toward the urban centres despite very unfavourable conditions at that time. The development of Greece after the revolution of 1821 proves beyond doubt how much the Greek is disposed to favour urban life and emigration. Although rural living conditions of the last decades are incomparably better than those existing during the Turkish occupation, we observe almost a mass emigration away from country homes to urban centres as well as an increase in permanent or temporary emigration abroad. As to be expected, professional mobility related to income, education, vocation, etc., also rose. But what is characteristic in these developments was not the restraining influence of Orthodoxy's "conservatism." A large part of the population which abandoned their rural homes to live in towns did not give up the old customs and views (preservation of family

⁵⁰ We should also point out that an increase of monastic properties meant a decrease in the field of survival for the agricultural population which, for this reason, was forced to move to the cities both during the Byzantine period and following it. Indeed, D. Savramis considers this phenomenon as one of the factors that contributed to the creation of an urban proletariat.

⁵¹ Cf. A. PAPADEROS, *Metakenosis*, pp. 17 f.

cohesiveness and other relationships mentioned above, persistence in traditional values, etc.). Nevertheless, the relatively rapid transition of the Greek Orthodox territory from its philanthropic structure, economy and agricultural life to the urban, econo-technical rationalism of contemporary international, industrial and commercial activity places the Orthodox Church before completely new types of problems. Confronting these problems within a traditional conceptual framework is impossible, since it presupposes a basically agricultural society which no longer exists.⁵²

Conclusions and Interpretations

Using the title of the last chapter of MA's treatise (367-370), we should like to compare and summarize the results of our attempt to clarify the matters discussed by the distinguished German scholar.

MA's "synthetic" method takes a higher stance, thus yielding a fuller and more extended comprehension of the issues, but this advantage should not keep us from examining important details that might otherwise escape our view. Such examination was the primary aim of our present analysis, and for that purpose we restricted the scope of our subject. Nevertheless a basic difficulty still remained: sociological research has barely touched the field of Orthodoxy. For this reason, persistent, detailed work will be needed to complete the survey of the whole field. As we have seen, many generalized conceptions of Orthodoxy have proven to be prejudiced. Such generalizations must be subjected to scholarly research for rectification.

We were able to confirm MA's starting point that the great metaphysical systems strongly influenced various social process, particularly in Byzantium. But, for reasons already mentioned, we could not follow his other presuppositions regarding the existence of a uniform economic style in eastern Orthodox Europe (until the revolutionary changes), because an economy is an inseparable part of the totality of a culture. We have seen that the European area covered by the Orthodox Church cannot be considered as culturally one throughout.

The investigation of concrete expressions of economic life within Orthodoxy proved, to everybody's satisfaction, we hope, that the conception of Orthodoxy's turning away from the world as a dominant characteristic is onesided and deficient. Instead, we emphasized the dialectic between assumption and repulsion of the world, or between the real and the ideal, as closer to the facts.

Subsequently, we confronted the complex of problems considered to be the direct or indirect results of the relationships between Church and state. Here, we could not possibly adopt MA's viewpoint that Orthodoxy was a kind of "state church" (*Staatskirche*). Instead, we pointed out the particular types of relationships which came into being with the help of specific ecclesiological, cultural and historical factors.

⁵² See A. PAPADEROS, "The Orthodox Academy of Crete. The Institution and its purposes" (in Greek) in *Dialogues of Responsibility I* (1971), pp. 66 f.

In a similar way, we also proved that the theory of the absence of counterforces capable of restraining state centralism and absolutism, does not hold, at least not in Byzantium. A sociological analysis of the phenomena showed that the legal aspect is not as important as the facts themselves.

Eventually, we examined the so-called conservatism of the Orthodox Church and its relation to economics. Here, it became apparent how necessary it is to investigate certain generalizations in the light of historical facts.

From what has been stated, the great value and timeliness of MA's pioneering treatise became evident. We broached only one of a great number of very serious problems before us, the relationship between Orthodoxy and economy, as a kind of preface to the problem itself. This, as well as the other issues contained in MA's treatise remain as a kind of mission, a challenge, for those of us Orthodox scholars who are going to investigate the phenomenon of religion sociologically.

- p. 33 first sentence for "helps us to understand"
read confronts our understanding
with
- p. 34 line 13 for "German scholar who honoured"
read German scholar who has honoured
- 17 for "our dialogue are"
read our dialogue is
- 1.21 notes for "Reliösen" read Religiösen
- p. 35 line 21 for " East European" read
Eastern European
- 27 for "alwaqs" read always
- p. 36 line 21 for "percept" read precept
- 38 for " from many reasons" read
for many reasons
- 1.2 notes for "KNECZNY" read KONECZNY
- p. 37 line 19 for "fiscal pomt" read focal point
- 1.9 notes for "was cutting" read
was the cutting
- p. 38 line 32 for "religiosity, those which .." read
religiosity, as those which
- last line for "grandiosse" read grandiose
- p. 39 lines 24/25 f. "but although it nevertheless
exerted"
- although it nevertheless exert
- p. 40 line 34 for "economic andeavours" read
economic endeavours
- p. 41 line 30 for "comes to following" read
comes to the following
- p. 42 (title) for "Αρωσις" read "Αρωσις
- p. 43 line 22 for "Monophysicism" read Monophysitism
- 1.2 notes f. "Abendlands" read Abendlandes
- 1.8 notes f. "Shristianity" read Christianity

- p. 46 line 9 for "indefferent" read indifferent
- p. 47 line 17 for "patriarchat" read patriarchate
- 1.5 of notes for "Einkommenverhältnisse" read Einkommensverhältnisse
- 1.6 of n. for "G.Forts" read 6 Forts.
- 1.7 of n. for "in byzantinischen" read im byzantinischen
- 1.8 of n. for "Abgabewese" read Abgabewesen
- 1.9 of n. for "mitte" read Mitte
- p. 48 line 9 for "renowed" read renowned
- 1.1 of n. for "alter" read alten
- 1.5 of n. for "VKALOPOULOS" read VAKALOPOULOS
- p. 50 line 10 for "theoretical basis exist" read not a theoretical basis exists
- 13 for "lhe" read the (Hierarchy of Heaven)
- 14 for "of a Dionysius" read of Dionysius
- 19 for "mtaintains" read maintains
- 25 for "noble class" read nobility (to be put in "inverted commas")
- 31 for "class of nobels" read nobility
- p. 51 lines 9/10 "which they colonized and cultivated with tax exemption" read colonized and cultivated them with tax exemptions. But .. (new sentence)
- p. 53 lines 9/10 "negative position this" read negative position to this
1. 22/23 for "The people threatened the state. The people can even be considered a permanent ..." read In effect the people can even be considered a permanent antipower.
- last line for "whence" read from where
- p. 54 line 2 for "could" read would
- 14 for "retroactively" read in retrospect
- 22/24 for "and why, instead, did it usually discourage such developments" read instead of usually discouraging such developments

54 line 33 for "M8" read MA

~~55 line 25 for "the state by its" read~~
~~the state with its~~

56 line 35 for "MA consider dogmatic" read
MA considers dogmatic
1.4 of n. for "kluturelle" read kulturelle
for "Aufklarung" read Aufklärung
6 of n. for "Blan" read Glan

57 line 1 for "discussion stimulated" read
discussion was stimulated
7 for "with only few" read
with few exceptions
1.2 of notes "Hellene" read Hellenen

58 line 25 for "austherity" read austerity

59 lines 2/3 f. "is probably not less than" read
are probably no less than

60 line 13 for "sitmatized" read stigmatized

61 line 42 for "sharing of tort, torture" read
sharing of torture

61 1.40 of notes for "Ionnis" read Jannis
1.49 of notes for "Lkostonion" read Lykostonion

64 line 42 for "population which" read
population who

65 line 16 for "might otherwiese" read
might otherwise

1.2 of n. for: "Responsability" read Responsibility

A.K.P. - dokimi